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How Safe is "Safe Enough?" 
FORUM 
HOW SAFE IS "SAFE ENOUGH?" 
Cass D. Howell 
A Edir question, is it not? When it comes to aviation safbty, just how & is safe enough? And, by the way, 
who gets to make this decision? Most of the time those of us in the aviation pro&ssions are involved in daily 
operational decisions that impact safety, but our view tends to be narrow and focused on a particular problem or 
situation, thus we lose sight of the "big picture." So let's step back for a moment and take a broad look at how and 
why policies, rules, and laws are made tbat affect aviation safety. 
First of all, as is readily evident, there is no one 
person, agency or company that is responsible for setting 
"the'' standad fur safety, at least not in this country. Even 
organizations such as the FAA and airline safety 
departments that am directly charged with establishing and 
enforcing safety regulations and procedures are only part of 
theanswertothequestionofwhodecideshowsafeissafe 
enough. In a system as large and complex as ours, which 
accountsfmaboat halfofall oftheaviationwtivityinthe 
world, safety policies are detemined by a multitude of 
individuals and organizations, some of them not even 
dimt ly  involved with aviation on a f m p n t  basis. 
Secondly, the standard of "safe enoughn is a constan@ 
moving target, usually evolving, but one that can be reset 
in a single day. Let's examine this second concept before 
going onto the question of who decide^. 
The answer to the "safe enoughn question lies in 
a milieu of separate but related standards that benchmark 
safety levels. The govmment, among other institutions, is 
in the business of establishing and enforcing regulations 
and operating practices that affect safety, and all aviation 
bthtions and agencies do some form of benchmarking 
when deciding at what level to set standards. For example, 
if we say that annme&al aviation today is reasonably safe, 
we must say, "Compared to what?" The most ready 
r e f e m  is the commercial aircraft accident rate per 
100,000 flight hours. For mishaps resulting in major 
damage, up to and including hull loss the rate for scheduled 
FAR Part 121 U.S. carriers in 2001 was 0.2. In 1959 the 
same rate was more than 30.0. By this comparison flying 
today is phenomenally safer than in years past. Does this 
mean that aviation in pmious eras was not "safe enough?" 
Not nemsady, because that concept is a constantly 
moving target, and the benchinarks available in the 1950's 
would have been c o w  to a still earlier era. In the 
1930's the commercial aviation accident rate was a 
staggering 280 per 100,000 flight hours, so aviators and 
regulatorsinthemesmusthaveseenthemse1vesas 
operating very safely indeed. 
Another benchmark is comparative statistics 
among various oqanhtions, such as airline's accident 
records compared to similar air carriers, which is very 
useful for regulators and safety -ts when deciding 
that things are going well, or that improvements are in 
order. The same applies to comparisons between categories 
of operations, for example Part 135 versus Part 121 
operators, or military accident rates contrasted with civil 
aviation rates. Thq aforementioned are some of the most 
powerful indicators, because the lowest accident rates 
indi~te what is aUually achievable in comparable 
circumstanoes. And, of course, you have heard of a 
common expression Meeting benchmarking when people 
say, "Flying is a lot safer than driving," true for 
commercial aviation but not necesady for General 
Aviation operations. 
Other benchmarks include comparisons among 
different countries or world regions. This is p e r m  more 
useful for other countries than for the U.S., since America 
generally leads the world in lowest aircraft accident rates. 
We most often compare ourselves to the combined 
European accident rates, since they are usually quite close 
to, or better than, U.S. mes Venturing beyond Enrope and 
North America, we see that some region's airlines are 
operating at risk levels 10 or even 20 times greater than 
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Perception also plays an important role in the 
assessment of how safe is safe enough. Although a 
particular airline may have a very solid overall safety 
record, a rash of accidents over a short time, or even a 
single accident that reveals important safety deficiencies, 
can w m m e  any reservoir of public trust that may have 
existed. The poster child for this arncept is the crash of the 
Valujet DC-9 in the Florida Everglades in 19%. That was 
the only accident Valujet ever had, but its name became 
synonymous with shoddy safety practices, so much so that 
the company was f o d  to change the name in order to stay 
in business. 
Of course, September 1 lm was the greatest change 
of al l  time regarding the concept of safe enougb, and we 
wil l  see changes for years to come as the nation struggles 
tosatisfysafetyconcernsthatarestillri~gabout. 
A final note on "safe enough." Even if there is 
consensus that flight operations are reasonably safe it does 
notmeanthatincfustryorthegwemmentsitontheir 
laurels and do not pursue improvements. To our collective 
credit, there is widespread determination that although 
current safety records may be acaqtable, there is always 
room for improvement, and that a zero accident rate is 
always the final goal. 
In a democracy such as ours, decision making and 
policy setting at the national level (and below as well) is a 
highly participatory process, invomg quite a diverse cast 
of characters. Forthe purpose ofthis discussion I wil l  call 
the groups "safety organhtions," though in the true sense 
of the word some are not actually organizations. All, 
however, exert si@cant influence in the aviation safety 
arena, and provide the answer to the question of who 
decides how safe is safe enough. They utilize the 
aforementioned markers, plus add some of their own. 
Pilot Unions are, of course, highly concerned with 
commercial aircraft safety, given that their members are 
affected by the lack of it in a highly personal way. 
Mower,  a well-organized union is in a position to make 
demands of management, force concessions from (or at 
least embarrass) management regarding safety issues, 
whether they are operational, training or equipment 
concerns. Another role filled by pilot unions is to bring to 
attention issues outside the direct mew ofthe air curiers 
that affect safety, such as publication ofthe "Black Star" 
list of unsafe airports. In this category also fell pilot union 
public campaigning against the Fxmh-made ATR series of 
turboprop aimaft that were seen as manifestly unsafe in 
icing conditions, even when properly flown. 
Aviation Insurance C o d e s  can play a large 
. . 
role in demmmq acceptable safety levels. Particularly 
for smaller operato* imuance companies can dictate 
minimum hiring standards for pilots, set their recurrent 
training requirements, and establish ground safety 
p~ufe~thatexceedFAArequirements,butthatmustbe 
complied with in order to obtain insurance. For insurance 
companies, safe enough is readily quantifiable into a 
number that represents monetary profit or loss. Any 
immnce company that is driven into the red by its client's 
high accident rate will most assuredly determine that "safe 
enough" has not been achieved. 
Effective and Accessible L e d  &stem, as used 
here, refers to the ability of individual members of the 
society to achieve redress for the negligence or malfeasance 
ofthose who have caused them harm. Perhaps the United 
States, more so than any other country, exemplifies this 
trait. Indeed, it may not even be necessary to p m  
negligence or malfeasance, since just the threat ofa lawsuit 
could yield large settlements against air carriers and 
manufacturers. The economic pain that comes with large 
judgments, or a series of them, is a huge economic 
incentive for companies to err on the side of safety, since 
the civil penalties following an adverse trial could spell the 
death knell for al l  but the strongest aviation businesses. 
Free and ODen Media. A society that has an 
unrestrained and inquisitive media, assuming a degree of 
integrity is present, is better infonned than one that does 
nat Though hard to quanw, the level of media reporting 
of unsafe wmmercial aviation activities is in itself a 
benchmark. First, the extensive coverage of an airliner 
crash alone can result in dramatic drops in passenger 
volumes, with the attendant plunge in revenues. Although 
the airlines don't typically publicize passenger decliues 
following the crash of one of their airliners, the events and 
aftermathof September 11 provideampleevidemeofthis 
correlation. On top of the loss of revenue due to empty 
seats is the tendency of the accompanying volumes of 
adverse publicity to result in legislation that may M e r  
regulate or restrict a carrier's operations, causing additional 
economic penalties, at least in the short run. The 
requkment that all air carriers in the U.S. install TCAS in 
short order was the direct result of the collision of a 
Aemmexico DC-9 and a Piper Archer in the vicinity of the 
largest media market in America, Los Angeles, in 1986. 
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Lastly, in a democracy, public opinion itself is a 
banmeter expressing confidence, or the lack of it, in the 
adequacy of safety measures in the nation's commercial 
aviation system. This occurs two ways: One, by avoidance 
behavior directed at a particular airline, or in the case of 
September 1 lm, at all airlines; and two, by expressing their 
concerns to their elected representatives. The public, as 
well as industry organizations and trade groups, also 
provide input on how much safety they are willing or able 
to pay for, since in large part safety is determhed by the 
amount of money available to fund it. I t  i s  t h e  
aforementioned players in the dety arena acting on their 
individual concerns that set and prioritize much of the 
safety agenda in this country. Ultimately these concerns 
are reflected back to the aviation industry via the actions of 
the FAA and other government agencies. This is not to say 
that the FAA or NTSB or other agencies concerned with 
flight safety don't hdepedently make "safe enoughn 
judgments, but the reality is that decision making is far 
more complex than it may seem at first blush. In the final 
analysis, there are no simple answers to the simple "who" 
and "safe enough" questions.+ 
Cass D. Howell is an Associate Prolbwr of Aeronautical Science at Embry-Riddle Aemmtical University in Daytona Beach, 
norida. He specializes in aviation safety and human factors topics. 
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